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Religion in Turkey 
Niyazi Öktem∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey is a secular state.1 Among Muslim countries, only Turkey 
and Senegal prescribe secularism in their constitutions. Secularism 
focuses on human reason rather than divine inspiration to resolve po-
litical or social issues2 and is one of the most important principles of 
the Turkish Republic.3 From the first republican Constitution of 
1924,4 through the more liberal and democratic Constitution of 
1961,5 and finally to the most recent and more authoritarian Consti-
tution of 1982,6 the concept of secularism has always occupied an 
important place in Turkish legislation. But in a country with an 
overwhelmingly Muslim majority, secular legislation always presents 
 
 ∗  Professor, Istanbul Bilgi University. 
 1. See DOUGLAS A. HOWARD, THE HISTORY OF TURKEY 5 (2001); RODERIC H. 
DAVISON, TURKEY: A SHORT HISTORY 4–5 (2d ed. 1988). 
 2. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2053 (1971) (defining 
secularism as “a view of life or any particular matter based on the premise that religion and re-
ligious considerations should be ignored or purposely excluded”). 
 3. See DAVID SHANKLAND, ISLAM AND SOCIETY IN TURKEY 22–25, 77–86 (1999) 
(discussing the careful contemporary blend of religion and secularism in Turkey); BERNARD 
LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 20–35, 76–80, 224–33, 244–69, 407–08 
(1968); see also Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in Europe: Reconsidering the Luxem-
bourg Exclusion, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 606, 629 (2000) (“Ataturk emphasized the seculari-
zation of the state in his post-World War I reforms, blaming Islamic and Ottoman institutions 
for the fall of the Ottoman Empire. He replaced Islamic law with European codes and the Ara-
bic script with Latin letters, all part of reducing religious power and substituting Islam with 
Turkish secularism.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally NIYAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY (1964). 
 4. See MEHMET YASAR GEYIKDA I, POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY: THE ROLE OF 
ISLAM 4, 55 (1984) (noting that the 1937 amendment defined Turkey as laïc (secular)). After 
the amendment of 1937, Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution reads, “The Turkish State is re-
publican, nationalist, statist, secular, and reformist.” Id. at 4. 
 5. See ERIK J. ZÜRCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 256–57 (rev. paperback ed. 
1997). 
 6. See TURK. CONST. art. 2, reprinted in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994), available at 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/constitution.htm; GEYIKDA I, supra note 4, at 143 (noting that 
Article 2 states that Turkey is based on, inter alia, secularism). 
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practical problems in the conduct of social life.7 For many Turks, 
general principles of Islam are not compatible with Western philoso-
phy. Muslim fundamentalists and some Muslim intellectuals believe 
that the ideas of democracy and secularism are inimical to Islamic 
dogma.8 
Clearly, certain Islamic traditions, interpretations, and practices 
are in conflict with the concept of a modern state.9 Nevertheless, phi-
losophically, sociologically, and theologically, Islam is multidimen-
sional. Historically, Turkey has not been a classically traditional Mus-
lim society. The historical, social, and cultural situations in Turkey 
have always fostered a synthesis between Islam and Western political 
thought.10 
 
 7. For an excellent treatment of the growing rift between secularism and Islam in Tur-
key, see MARVINE HOWE, TURKEY TODAY: A NATION DIVIDED OVER ISLAM’S REVIVAL 
(2000). 
 8. See generally id.; SHANKLAND, supra note 3. 
 9. See generally Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Univer-
sality Debate, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95 (2000); THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Eugene Co-
tran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000); Edna Boyle-Lewicki, Need World’s Collide: The Hudad Crimes 
of Islamic Law and International Human Rights, 13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 43 (2000); 
DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 
1999); ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS (3d 
ed. 1999); JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW (Gerald E. Lampe ed., 1997); 
Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and North Africa, 
10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 139 (1996); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human 
Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307 (1994). 
 10. This “Republican approach” to religion is taught to Turkish youth early on through 
the primary education curricula. For example: 
[a] text given to third-year students, written by Professor Fi lali . . . contains . . . de-
tailed justification of the Republican approach to religion, taken here from the tenth 
printing of the text: 
Secularism is a French word. . . . In the dictionary it is defined . . . as some-
thing without religion. . . . 
     In the fifteenth century in the West . . . religion was separated from the af-
fairs of state. The state, though religion no longer mixed with its affairs, itself 
showed respect to religion. . . . Accordingly, secularism is certainly not 
unbelieving. In secularism, religion meets the sublime with complete freedom 
of conscience and belief. As a matter of fact, Atatürk says on this subject: 
Secularism has never been atheism but has opened the way to struggle 
against false faith and superstition, and has allowed the development of 
true religion. Those who want to confuse secularism with atheism are 
none other than enemies against progress and life, eastern tribal fanatics 
who have not let the scales fall from their eyes.  
After further discussion, Fi lali summarizes his overall argument in the form of five 
points, as follows: 
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Describing both the historical and current philosophies of Turk-
ish Muslims and non-Muslims creates a foundation for explaining 
how Islamic beliefs can be reconciled with Western progressivism. 
Part II of this article will present the current sociological and demo-
graphic situations in Turkey. Part III will detail the historical back-
ground of various religious traditions that have influenced Turkey’s 
demographic structure. Part IV will then discuss the current legal 
status of the various Islamic sects and describe the numerous prob-
lems each sect presently faces. Finally, Part V will offer a brief conclu-
sion. 
II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC  
SITUATIONS IN TURKEY 
Before discussing the current legislative situation in Turkey, this 
section will address the sociological, demographic, and historical as-
pects of religion in Anatolia. 
A. Muslims in Turkey 
The population of Turkey today is estimated to be between sixty-
two and sixty-five million,11 of which ninety-nine percent are at least 
nominally Muslim.12 The great majority of Turkish Muslims are of 
the Sunn  branch of Islam, as are a great majority of Muslims in the 
world.13 However, in Eastern Turkey, near the Iranian border, par-
ticularly among numerous villages in Kars, reside many fervent Mus-
lims of the Sh a sect. There is also an important community of Shias 
 
In a secular country: 
• The affairs of religion and state are separate. 
• In it, there is freedom of worship, belief and conscience. Fanaticism is 
never tolerated. 
• Extremist movements are avoided. 
• No one makes any other person embrace a religion or sect by force. 
• Those who wish to use religion for their personal gain are not permitted 
to do so.  
SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 24–25 (emphasis added). 
 11. See HOWARD, supra note 1, at 4; SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 136. 
 12. See HOWARD, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 13. See id. at 6. “Sunni” is the popular term derived from the Arabic Ahl al-Sunna wa ‘l-
Jam ’a, meaning “‘The People of the (established) Custom and the Community’ (in the sense 
of a single, normative political entity).” FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 395 (2d ed. 1994). See generally id. at 83, 92–93, 206–07 (review-
ing the emergence of Sunni Islam). 
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living in Istanbul. Shia literally means “party,” “faction,” or “sect,” 
and denotes those Muslims who are faithful to the genealogical line 
of Ali,14 the cousin of Mohammed.15 Shias believe that this genea-
logical line (ahl-i Beyt)16 was inherited from Mohammed through his 
daughter Fatima, the wife of Ali,17 a divine light that is still transmit-
ted through Ali’s successors. The total number of Turkish Shias is 
estimated to be approximately 300,000. 
Another Islamic sect faithful to the genealogical line of Ali are 
the Alevis.18 However, this common devotion to Ali and respect for 
his genealogical successors is the only link between Alevis and ortho-
dox Shias.19 Alevis do not accept many of the traditions and rituals of 
Shias. For example, Alevis do not fast during the Holy Month of 
Ramadan, instead fasting for twelve days during the month of Mou-
harrem; they do not go on the Haj, or pilgrimage to Mecca; nor do 
they pray five times daily; and the Alevi women do not veil them-
selves.20 
Even among the poorest, most uneducated sections of the Alevi 
community, a certain degree of enlightenment and sophistication ex-
ists. They have always taken part in progressive activities;21 some 
 
 14. See id. at 395. See generally id. at 83, 92, 94–96, 101, 206–07 (reviewing the emer-
gence of Shia Islam). 
 15. See id. at 66. 
 16. “‘People of the House,’ namely the family of the Prophet.” Id. at 387. 
 17. See id. at 66, 83. 
 18. For a brief essay on Alevis in Turkey, see SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 132–68. See 
also David Zeidan, The Alevi of Anatolia, 3 MIDDLE EAST REV. INT’L AFF., Dec. 14, 1999, 
available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue4/jv3n4a5.html; John Shindeldecker, 
Turkish Alevis Today, available at  http://www.isik.ch/alevi/alevi_ john_English.htm. 
 19. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 139. Interestingly, however, in the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Anatolian Alevis supported the Shiite, Iranian-Turkish political thinker, Shah Ismail, 
an enigmatic character that possessed the contradictory characteristics of a humanist poet and 
cruel tribal chieftain. See GODFREY GOODWIN, THE JANISSARIES 120 (1994); David Zeidan, 
The Alevi of Anatolia: Turkey’s Largest Minority (1995), available at  
http://www.angelfire.com/az/rescon/ALEVI.html. Further, although the Anatolian Alevis 
are significantly different from other Alevis in Southeast Turkey, the Bektashi Brotherhood of 
the Balkan Peninsula seems to constitute an important connection between the two regions. 
Some people even consider the Bektashis to be the Alevi elite. See generally Zeidan, supra note 
18. 
 20. See generally Zeidan, supra note 18; Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
 21. A source of great pride to Alevis is their adamant claim that they were instrumental 
in the support of Ataturk and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. See SHANKLAND, supra 
note 3, at 152–54. Even today, many Alevis are staunch secularists. See Zeidan, supra note 18. 
Shankland concludes that Alevism, “a traditional, rural mystical tradition [has] metamor-
phose[d] into an urban secular philosophy.” SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 165. 
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Alevis are even Marxists.22 This group consists of twelve to fifteen 
million Turks, comprising twenty to twenty-five percent of the total 
Anatolian population.23 
B. Non-Muslims in Turkey 
1. Demographics and general problems of non-Muslims in Turkey 
The numbers of non-Muslims within the Turkish State, most of 
whom live in Istanbul or other large cities, are estimated as follows:24 
• 50,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians 
• 25,000 Jews 
• 15,000–20,000 Syrian Orthodox Christians (Syriac) 
• 5000–7000 Yezidies 
• 2000–3000 Greek Orthodox Christians 
• A small number of Nestorians 
Religious minorities, recognized under the terms of the 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923,25 along with their affiliated churches, 
monasteries, and schools, are regulated by a separate government 
agency, The Office of Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Müdürlügü) 
(VGM). The VGM must approve all operations of churches, monas-
teries, synagogues, religious hospitals, schools, orphanages, and 
other similar organizations.26 
According to the Lausanne Treaty religious minorities cannot 
acquire additional property for churches or religious institutions be-
 
 22. Zeidan, supra note 18, states: 
The resurgence of Sunni fundamentalism that began in the 1950s and has recently 
grown much stronger also pushed the Alevis to the political left. Many Alevis 
reacted by stressing their separate identity and reinterpreting Alevism in socialist and 
Marxist idiom that seemed to have an affinity to Alevi ideals of equality and 
traditions of revolt.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 23. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 136 (estimating ten to twenty million); Zeidan, 
supra note 18 (claiming fifteen million); Shindeldecker, supra note 18 (citing between ten and 
twenty million). 
 24. See HOWARD, supra note 1, at 6. 
 25. Treaty of Lausanne, Jul. 24, 1923, arts. 38–40, Allies-Turk., reprinted in CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, 2 THE TREATIES OF PEACE: 1919–1923, at 957 
(1924), available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html [hereinafter 
Treaty of Lausanne]. 
 26. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM: TURKEY, available at  http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/ 
5694.htm  (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT]. 
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yond that held in the days before the foundation of the Republic.27 
If, for any reason, religious minorities are unable to support their 
existing property, the VGM may require that the title to such 
property revert back to the state.28 As the Christian population in 
Turkey is declining, the risk of losing religious property has become 
a very real problem.29 The theoretical right to acquire more property 
exists if a religious minority is able to establish a clear need; however, 
the VGM has never approved such a request.30 
Religious minorities may maintain their buildings through au-
thorized restoration projects. The Regional Board for the Protection 
of Cultural and National Wealth may approve reconstruction and 
restoration projects if the buildings at issue are considered to be his-
torical landmarks or to have cultural value.31 Unfortunately, the Re-
gional Board reports directly to the Turkish government and is sensi-
tive to public pressure; therefore, its decisions have a conjectural 
aspect. To illustrate, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate could not get 
permission to restore the buildings of the Phanar for more than 
thirty years, finally receiving authorization only after Turgut Ozal 
was elected President of the Republic in 1989.32 However, Christian 
minorities today usually obtain permission to carry out restoration 
work without any complicated bureaucratic obstacles. 
The Turkish government does little to officially prohibit religious 
activity. The Government allows religious groups to freely publish 
religious literature. Likewise, proselytizing and religious propaganda 
are not officially prohibited, but in practice missionary activities are 
not well received either by conservative Muslims or by the state.33 To 
cite an example, in towns severely hit by the earthquakes of 1999, 
humanitarian relief offered by Christian missionaries was criticized 
both in the media and by some government bodies.34 
 
 27. See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 25. 
 28. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26. 
 29. See id.; Amberin Zaman, Orthodox Patriarch Puts His Faith in Hands of Clinton, 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 21, 1997, available at 1997 WL 2340037 (noting that the Greek 
Orthodox population has decreased from 150,000 to only 5,000). 
 30. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Vedat Erdamar, Greek Orthodox Building Reopens in Turkey After 48-Year Dis-
pute, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 17, 1989, available at 1989 WL 4075285. 
 33. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26. 
 34. By the same token, aid offered by Islamic foundations was not well received either, 
as it was seen as a vehicle for the spread of fundamentalist ideas. See Lori Montgomery, Islamic 
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Historically, Christians living in the East experienced difficulty 
obtaining permission to teach their native languages, particularly the 
Syriac Christians who live in a “sensitive zone.” However, in Octo-
ber 1997, the Syriac Church received authorization to conduct 
classes in Aramaic in the monasteries of Deyrul Umur and Deyrulze-
faran in Southeast Anatolia.35 In general, Christians living in Istan-
bul, where the great majority of them are located, have not experi-
enced similar problems. 
2. The Ecumenical Patriarchate 
According to Christian tradition, the Patriarch of the Phanar in 
Istanbul is considered primus inter pares among the five patriarchies 
(Alexandria, Jerusalem, Antioch, Constantinople, and Rome), al-
though Roman Catholics and some other denominations have dis-
puted this claim since the Middle Ages. But the Turkish government 
does not recognize the Patriarchate’s claimed status—something dif-
ficult to understand because this classification should remain a purely 
Christian matter, meaningless to a state so overwhelmingly Muslim.36 
Yet, the government has continually monitored the Greek Orthodox 
Church’s activities and remains suspicious of the Phanarites’ per-
ceived ambition to restore the Byzantine Empire37—and not without 
reason. The political and nationalist concept of the “Megali Idea”38 
has occupied a prominent place in the minds of some Greek Ortho-
dox leaders. In fact, for many such leaders the nostalgia for a lost 
utopia rules their lives—even leading to the purchase of several sig-
nificant buildings in Istanbul. 
Similar to other Christian communities, the Greek Orthodox 
 
Quake Aid Hampered: Secular Turkish Government Appears Uneasy, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 27, 
1999, available at 1999 WL 23989629. 
 35. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: TURKEY available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ 
human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_turkey99.html (Sept. 9, 1999). 
 36. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26. 
 37. See Zaman, supra note 29. Following World War I, Greece claimed much of West-
ern Asia Minor as its own, but ultimately gave up those claims in the settlement outlined in the 
Treaty of Lausanne. See generally SALAHI RAMSDAN SONYEL, TURKISH DIPLOMACY 1918–
1923: MUSTAFA KEMAL AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT (1975). 
 38. “[T]he Megali Idea (Great Idea) . . . aimed at the resurrection of the Byzantine 
Empire with Istanbul as its capital.” SONYEL, supra note 37, at 6. See ERIK LANCE KNUDSEN, 
GREAT BRITAIN, CONSTANTINOPLE, AND THE TURKISH PEACE TREATY 1919–1922, 71 
(1987) (citing MICHAEL LEWELLYN SMITH, IONIAN VISION 4 (1973)). 
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Church of the Phanar struggles to educate its priests. The Orthodox 
seminary on the island of Halki (Heybeliada) was closed in 1971 
when the Turkish government nationalized all private institutions of 
higher education.39 Current restrictions prevent certain religious 
communities from training new clergy to eventually take over their 
leadership.40 However, since the visit between Patriarch Bartholo-
mew and President Clinton in 199741 and the acceptance of Turkey 
as a candidate for accession to the European Union in December 
1999,42 the government has slightly altered its position. The Univer-
sity of Istanbul recently formed a Department of Christian Theology 
as a part of the School of Theology. Unfortunately, this “conces-
sion” will probably never satisfy the Christian communities because 
of the difficulties inherent in training Christian clergy at a Muslim 
school of theology. 
3. New approaches 
Recently, the Turkish State has undertaken a new, friendlier dia-
logue with its non-Muslim citizens. In 1998, President Suleyman 
Demirel invited the Cem Vakfi leadership to discuss the plight of 
Turkish Alevis with him.43 Cem Vakfi’s aim “is to re-orientate Alevi 
religion towards the state in such a way that it becomes perceived as 
a primarily religious tradition, a legitimate, moderate form of Islam 
that should be recognised by the Republic.”44 In 1999, President 
Demirel congratulated Christians on Christmas Eve for the first time 
in the history of the Republic.45 Additionally, the head of the Presi-
dency (or Directorate) of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) 
(“DIB”) instituted celebrations to mark the completion of the sec-
ond millennium since the birth of Jesus Christ—a personage also re-
vered in Islam as a holy man of God and an important predecessor of 
 
 39. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26; Zaman, supra note 29. 
 40. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26. 
 41. See Zaman, supra note 29. 
 42. See Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions ¶ 12 (Dec. 10–11, 1999), 
available at  http://europa.eu.int/. 
 43. See id. at 162. 
 44. Id. The efforts of Cem Vakfi are highly controversial among the Alevis themselves. 
Many feel that reconciliation with the decreasingly Republican, Sunni-controlled state is not 
possible or even desirable. Furthermore, Alevi youth are becoming more secular, thus distanc-
ing themselves from Alevi religious traditions. See id. at 163. 
 45. See In Brief, TURK. PROBE, Dec. 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7765881. 
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the Prophet Mohammed.46 The Presidency of Religious Affairs also 
organized a conference in 2000 in Tarsus, at the town of Sain 
Pauvlus (Saint Paul), commemorating the birth of Jesus Christ, to 
which the non-Muslim, Turkish spiritual leaders were invited. The 
DIB also established a Department for Interreligious Dialogue. In 
November 1998, the Department organized the Second Council of 
Religion, during which several Christian leaders were able to con-
tribute significantly to the section devoted to religious dialogue. The 
Greek Patriarch, Bartholomeos II, and Cardinal Arinze from the 
Vatican both spoke at this event. This Council was in sharp contrast 
to the First Council of Religion of 1993, when the proposal to enter 
into dialogue with other religions received a hostile reception as a 
means for introducing Christian missionaries into Turkey. It is en-
couraging that within five years the state’s perspective on interrelig-
ious dialogue appears to have fundamentally changed. 
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Although it is difficult to discover the characteristics of a no-
madic people, many scholars have described the history of the Turk-
ish tribes in Central Asia, which goes back to the fifth and sixth cen-
turies A.D. According to some scholars, the Turks of Central Asia 
were shamanists,47 so called because the preacher or holy man of 
such tribes, who interpreted divinity and possessed magic powers, is 
called a shaman by academics. But shamanism is not a religion, it is a 
cult. As the Turkish tribes poured into Anatolia, they belonged to 
naturalistic, pantheistic religions such as Buddhism, Brahmanism, 
and Hinduism. Thereafter, many of the tribes adopted Mazdaist, 
Manichean, and Nestorian Christianity depending upon the prevail-
ing religion of the areas to which they migrated. Not surprisingly, 
tribes living close to Persia adopted various forms of Zoroastrianism. 
Missionaries from the different religions sped up the process by ac-
tively endeavoring to convert the nomadic Turks, at the same time 
transforming many of them into more sedentary peoples. The Turks 
who converted often succeeded in creating a synthesis between their 
new beliefs and the beliefs of their former creeds.48 
 
 46. See, e.g., KORAN 2:87, 136, 252; 4:163; 5:110; 33:7. 
 47. See DENNY, supra note 13, at 100; GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 20. 
 48. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 146, 194 n.19 (noting that a certain Alevi cere-
mony is strikingly similar to a ceremony practiced today by Greek Christians); DENNY, supra 
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This entire process of religious aggregation was repeated when 
Muslim Arab invaders conquered Central Asia. Thus, the faith and 
theology of Anatolian Muslims is based on an aggregate blend of re-
ligious traditions, or what I term a “multidimensional harmonization 
of faiths.” The result in modern Turkey is the existence of many di-
verse sects of Islam, including the Alevi, Hallaji, Babi, and Arabi tra-
ditions. This part of the article will trace the historical background of 
these traditions. 
A. The Early Muslim Tradition 
When Muslim Arab invaders originally conquered Central Asia, 
they forced the Turks to accept Islam. Later in that century, how-
ever, the Turks began to willingly adopt Islam, preferring sedentary 
life as mercenaries of the Abbasid Caliphs, which allowed them to 
live in cities with their families. Yet, the traditions and practices of 
the Turk’s ancient religions were not easily left behind. During the 
tenth century A.D.,49 recently converted Turks were familiar with the 
two main streams of Islam—the Sunni and the Shia—and they syn-
thesized these beliefs with those of their previous forms of worship, 
accepting Islam as part of a multidimensional harmonization of 
faiths. One of the most important of these syntheses is found in the 
case of the Alevis, who to this day follow some of the traditions of 
their ancient cults and religions. 
B. The Alevi Tradition 
The Alevi sect arose out of an opposition movement against the 
Umayyads that climaxed at the battle of Siffin in A.D. 657.50 Thereaf-
ter, the Muslim community split into two principal branches, those 
 
note 13, at 100 (hypothesizing that the mystical nature found in much of Turkish Islam stems 
from combination with the “[Turks’] aboriginal shamanic beliefs and practices”); Markus 
Dressler, Bektashi Order (Bektashiye), available at  http://alevibektasi.com/bektasi_order.htm  
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002) (“Concerning their rites and doctrines the Bektashiye appears ex-
tremely syncretistic. Alongside diverse influences of heterodox Muslim Mysticism it comprises 
and melts preislamic Turkish Shaman, as well as certain Christian elements.”). 
 49. Throughout this article, I employ the Gregorian calendar to mark significant dates. 
However, year one of the Muslim calendar began in A.D. 622, the year marking the Hijra 
(emigration) of the Muslim community from Mecca to Medina. Thus, A.D. 622 may be ren-
dered A.H. 1 (anno Hegirae “in the year of [Mohammed’s] Hijra”). See DENNY, supra note 13, 
at  72–73. 
 50. See id. at 91 (describing the Battle of Siffin). 
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faithful to Mohammed’s bloodline through Ali, and those faithful to 
the Sunni Caliph, Muawiya. The Alevis, who remained faithful to the 
bloodline and tradition of Ali and his two sons, Hassan and Hussein, 
still demonstrate their contempt for Muawiya during the religious 
ceremony of Ayin-i Djem.51 This ceremony commemorates the anni-
versary of the martyrdom of Hussein at Kerbala, Iraq on the tenth 
day of the month of Mouharrem in A.D. 680 and is observed by a 
twelve-day fast.52 Unlike the orthodox Shia ceremony honoring Hus-
sein, which includes theatrical, bloody feats of self-flagellation,53 
Alevis prefer to demonstrate their devotion by calmly singing and 
dancing around allegorical images of the Kerbala incident.54 
Because of the strictness of the Umayyad dynasty, many Shias 
and Alevis who chose to remain faithful to Ali concealed their con-
victions. They often claimed to be Sunni, while in fact remaining 
faithful to their own religious beliefs, applying the doctrinal principle 
known as taqiyye,55 which may be compared to the practice of Span-
ish Jews during the Inquisition. The sophists of the Umayyad dy-
nasty, although they were Sunni, also had a certain sympathy for the 
traditions of Ali. 
C. The Hallaji Tradition 
Many Alevi Muslims know Islam from the viewpoint of Hallajian 
sufism. Hussein Ibn Mansor El Hallaj lived from A.D. 857 to 922 
and was crucified in Baghdad by the Abbasid Caliph and Vizier 
Hamd.56 During his life, Hallaj traveled to Transoxiana many times. 
“The final goal of Hallaj’s longest journey was to reach and to ‘evan-
gelize’ the Turkish race in its cultural center.”57 Hallaj preached at 
both the Nestorian Turks’ cultural center at Almalig and that of the 
 
 51. Also rendered Ayini Cem. See Shindeldecker, supra note 18 (providing detailed de-
scription of the Ayini Cem ceremony). 
 52. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 139 (noting that key Alevi rituals mark the mar-
tyrdom of Hussein); DENNY, supra note 13, at 94–95 (describing the Kerbala incident); id. at 
313 (describing the origins of the Mouharrem fast). 
 53. The ta’ziya, or passion play. See DENNY, supra note 13, at 314–16. 
 54. See Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
 55. See Zeidan, supra note 18 (describing how Alevis, Druze, and Shias opposed Sunni 
Ottomans during the sixteenth century and survived by developing, inter alia, “dissimulation 
and secrecy about their religion[s] (taqiya)”). 
 56. See LOUIS MASSIGNON, 1 THE PASSION OF AL-HALL J: MYSTIC AND MARTYR OF 
ISLAM 33 (Herbert Mason trans., 1982). 
 57. Id. at 182 (footnote omitted). 
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the Manicheans at Qocho.58 Hallaj arrived in Qocho in A.D. 866,59 
and one of his sons even settled nearby at Nishapur.60 “The Hallajian 
legend held a very high place in the Islamicization of Turkish peo-
ples; it not only presented them with a moving literary leitmotiv, it 
also provided for them an ideal model of sanctity.”61 
The Diwan and hikam of Ahmet Yesawi, as well as the literary 
works of may others, brought the philosophy of Hallaj to Turkey.62 
The disciples of Yesawi and other mystic Hallajians of Transoxiana 
were the missionary precursors who infiltrated Anatolia during the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries and were known as the Saints or Her-
mits of Horosan (Horosan Erenleri). Among the heterodox groups 
to which they belonged, the Saints of Horosan were familiarly 
known as Father (Baba) or Grandfather (Dede). They were very close 
to Manichean, Mazdaist, and sometimes Buddhist-shamanist cults, 
and thus preached nonconformist doctrines and diffused an Islam 
that was simple and more accessible than that practiced and spread 
by the Sunni Faqihs.63 
The Hallajian influence in Turkey is still very clear and very dis-
tinct. For its adherents, the purification of the heart and spirit pre-
vails over all other religious rites.64 This premise underlies the dis-
tinctive character of the Alevis and the Anatolian Bektashis: they do 
not perform daily prayer at set times, they do not fast during Rama-
dan, nor do they undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca.65 For Hallaji-
ans, the fundamental purpose of all religious rites is the purification 
of the human heart. They claim that this purified state is attainable 
without following either the Sunni or the Shia forms of worship. 
D. The Babi Tradition 
The infiltration of heterodox dervishes into Anatolia created a 
 
 58. See id. at 184. 
 59. See id. at 185. 
 60. See id. at 26, 170. 
 61. See LOUIS MASSIGNON, 2 THE PASSION OF AL-HALLAJ: MYSTIC AND MARTYR OF 
ISLAM 231 (Herbert Mason trans., 1982) (footnote omitted). 
 62. See MASSIGNON, supra note 56, at 162, 228, 231–74. 
 63. A faqih is an expert in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence); a jurist. See DENNY, supra note 
13, at 388. 
 64. See LOUIS MASSIGNON, 3 THE PASSION OF AL-HALLAJ: MYSTIC AND MARTYR OF 
ISLAM (Herbert Mason trans., 1982) (outlining in detail the teachings of Hallaj). 
 65. See Zeidan, supra note 18; Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
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spirit of opposition against the Seljuk dynasty, under which the ma-
jority followed the inherited Umayyad and Abbasid fiqh.66 The der-
vishes Baba Ressoul and Baba Ishak, with the support of the masses, 
led a rebellion in the thirteenth century against the monarchy.67 The 
Seljuk Amir, Necmuddin, with the aid of an army partly made up of 
Turkish, Georgian, Kurdish, and Christian mercenaries, defeated the 
“Rebellion of the Babas.” The Christian mercenaries were placed in 
the leading rank of Necmuddin’s army. 
The famous Haci Bektash Veli, founder of the Bektashi order, 
followed the Babi tradition.68 The Bektashi brotherhood still has 
some of the characteristics of Hallajian ideology. For example, the 
purported Gibbet of Mansor (Daré Mansour) plays a structural and 
fundamental role in their ceremony of initiation.69 
Islam in Anatolia was established through harmonization of the 
Hallajian tradition with a form of Christianity, most notably found in 
the East, which itself retained some of the characteristics and con-
cepts of Manichean cults. Further west, in rural and mountain dis-
tricts, remnants of pagan traditions can be detected in the practice of 
Islam. Even today, in western Anatolian villages, some dances and 
religious rituals of the Alevis are analogous to certain rites associated 
with the Dionysian mysteries. 
Occidental sources estimate the population of Anatolia during 
this period was 10,000,000, of which Central Asian Turks made up 
only 300,000. However, oriental sources indicate there were 
4,000,000 native Anatolians (Greeks and Armenians) and more than 
1,000,000 Turks. Whatever the true situation, Anatolia in the elev-
enth and twelfth centuries witnessed the meeting and synthesis of 
the cultures, sects, and religious practices of various diverse peoples. 
Because of this, I believe that the cultural aspect of the Anatolian 
Alevi interpretation of Islam resulted from this time period. 
E. The Arabi Tradition 
In the twelfth century, a new pantheism shook the foundations 
 
 66. In other words, Sunni Islam. 
 67. See Dressler, supra note 48; Haci Bektas Veli, available at  
http://www.turkishnews.com/DiscoverTurkey/who/hbektas/  (last visited Mar. 22, 2002) 
[hereinafter Haci Bektas Veli]. 
 68. See Haci Bektas Veli, supra note 67. 
 69. See MASSIGNON, supra note 56, at 187, 619–20. 
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of faith in Anatolia. Mouhyiddin Ibn Arabi, a native of Spain, 
preached to the Muslim people of Anatolia a mystic doctrine of de-
cidedly immanent character.70 After leaving Spain to move further 
east, Arabi performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and later settled in 
Anatolia.71 There he attracted many disciples, and the influence of his 
mysticism had profound effects in Anatolia during the reign of the 
Seljuk Empire. 
Arabi taught that Divinity imposes itself as an Aristotelian imma-
nence expressed through a universal monism. This belief does not 
exclude the virtues of discursive reason; on the contrary, Arabi’s mys-
ticism considers such reason as the way to attain ecstatic union with 
God. Man integrates with Him to achieve annihilation of the soul 
and a loss of separate consciousness and personal ego similar to the 
Buddhist concept of Nirvana. Arabi is one of the most illuminative 
exponents of Muslim heterodox mysticism, professing that ultimate 
truth and perfection lie in a pantheistic synthesis.72 This mysticism, 
among orthodox Muslims, is characterized by its sobriety and austere 
asceticism in which the divine essence always stays concealed under a 
shroud of sublimity. Human reason is incapable of reaching this 
Transcendence. Muslim orthodoxy, faithful to the thoughts of Plato, 
always foresees a clear and absolute separation between the world of 
ideas and that of the senses. 
On the other hand, in Christianity, which is faithful to the inter-
pretation of Aristotle, creation and existence are explained by a uni-
versal monism. Transcendence in Christianity is not as completely in-
accessible to the senses as it is in orthodox Islam. 
F. The Christian Tradition of the Janissaries 
In the faith of Anatolian Alevis, the concept of a Trinity exists 
that is similar to the same concept in Christianity. In the Alevi Trin-
ity, Hakk (the Godhead or Ultimate Good), Mohammed, and Ali, 
respectively, take the places of the Christian Trinity’s Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.73 A definite parallel also exists between Christian 
devotion to the Virgin Mary and Alevi devotion to Fatima, wife of 
 
 70. See ALEXANDER D. KNYSH, IBN ‘ARABI IN THE LATER ISLAMIC TRADITION: THE 
MAKING OF A POLEMICAL IMAGE IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 6–16 (1999). 
 71. See id. at 7–8. 
 72. See The Mystic Tide: Muid ad-Din ibn al-Arabi, available at  
http://www.shunya.net/Text/Islam/MysticTide.htm  (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). 
 73. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 146; Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
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votion to the Virgin Mary and Alevi devotion to Fatima, wife of Ali 
and daughter of Mohammed. These parallels may be attributed to 
the widespread and long-lasting Ottoman practice of conscripting 
Christian youths into the Janissary Corps.74 The youths were usually 
enrolled by the state into military training between the ages of eight 
and eighteen.75 And despite the intense Islamic indoctrination that 
was a part of Janissary training,76 the young soldiers always retained 
traces of their original religious and cultural beliefs. This undoubt-
edly explains the tendency of Christian Janissaries to join the less 
rigid Bektashi-Alevi brotherhood.77 
The Janissaries’ glorious advance west that took the Ottomans to 
the gates of Vienna did not fundamentally affect the traditions and 
religions of Eastern Europe. Other than some Albanian, Bosnian, 
and Bulgarian tribes, the Eastern Europeans generally remained 
faithful to Eastern Christian Orthodoxy, even at the cost of having to 
pay large taxes to their Turkish conquerors.78 Those who did convert 
to Islam under the Ottoman Empire chose the Alevi-Bektashi inter-
pretation of Islam.79 Bektashi brotherhoods are still widespread in 
Albania, Skopje, and Kosova. The respected British writer, Rebecca 
West, describes her visit to Bektashi villages in Macedonia on the oc-
casion of the Feast of St. George.80 Many centuries ago, the local 
Bogomils refused to abandon this saint when they converted to Is-
lam. They believed that St. George could mediate with the Godhead 
on fertility issues, and this important Christian Saint remains a part 
of the religious pantheon of local Bektashis to this day. 
It is thought provoking to observe that these new heterodox 
Muslims were once equally heterodox Christians—Manichean Bo-
gomils. Mani or Manes was born in Southeast Anatolia in A.D. 216, 
and his teachings became widespread on three continents, bringing 
 
 74. See GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 27, 148; YAHYA ARMAJANI & THOMAS M. RICKS, 
MIDDLE EAST: PAST AND PRESENT 117, 119 (2d ed. 1986). 
 75. See GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 36. 
 76. See id. at 28, 34, 47–48; ARMAJANI & RICKS, supra note 74, at 117, 119. 
 77. See GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 28, 148 (“[T]he janissaries were well-disposed to-
wards [the Bektashis].”); ARMAJANI & RICKS, supra note 74, at 117; Zeidan, supra note 19 
(noting that the Bektashi order was closely associated with the Janissary Corps). 
 78. See GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 55. 
 79. See Official Alevi-Bektashi Research Site at http://www.alevibektasi.com/in-
dex1.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). 
 80. See REBECCA WEST, BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: A JOURNEY THROUGH 
YUGOSLAVIA 810–31 (1943). 
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about a harmonization between Christian and Mazdaist theologies.81 
According to Manichean theology, everything sprang from two reali-
ties—light and darkness or good and evil.82 The heterodoxies of both 
Christian and Muslim deviations have their roots in this Manichean 
principle. 
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF RELIGION IN TURKEY 
A. Generally 
Secularism, one of the basic pillars of the Turkish Republic, is en-
shrined in both the Constitution of 1982 and its two predecessors. 
Article 2 of the present Constitution describes the Republic as secu-
lar.83 Article 24 articulates the principle of freedom of religion and 
conscience and relates secularism with a right to freedom of convic-
tion.84 This grants everyone “freedom of conscience, religious belief 
and conviction”85 qualified only by a limitation on the abuse of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of other people.86 The Constitu-
tion permits believers to carry out rites of worship and to conduct 
religious services and ceremonies, but it also requires that “[n]o one 
shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremo-
nies and rites,”87 and that “[n]o one shall be allowed to exploit or 
abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, 
in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political 
influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, eco-
nomic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.”88 
Turkey has no official state religion. The articles of the Constitu-
tion dealing with freedom of religion reflect the philosophical ap-
proach of modern states and provide for a certain conformity with 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
 
 81. But see DMITRI OBOLENSKY, THE BOGOMILS: A STUDY IN BALKAN NEO-
MANICHAEISM 15 (1972). 
 82. See id. at 5–6. 
 83. TURK. CONST., supra note 6, art. 2. 
 84. Id. art. 24. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. art. 14. 
 87. Id. art. 24. 
 88. Id. 
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and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or be-
lief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, prac-
tice, worship and observance.”89 
However, the Constitution also obligates the state to provide 
Sunni Muslim religious education in elementary and secondary 
schools,90 a regulation that conflicts with the principles of a modern, 
secular state. In Turkey, where ninety-nine percent of the population 
is Muslim, compelling Christian and Jewish children to receive a 
Sunni Muslim religious education cannot be reconciled with the phi-
losophies of liberalism, human rights, or religious freedom. This 
poses a particular problem for Syriac Christians because the Treaty of 
Lausanne did not recognize them as a minority religion.91 The 
Treaty did recognize the other Christian denominations, Greek and 
Armenian, granting them minority status and thus exemption from 
Islamic religious instruction by law.92 Also affected are the fifteen to 
twenty percent of Turkish Muslims who are Alevi.93 The state main-
tains its right to compel Alevi Muslims to receive Sunni Muslim in-
struction in school. 
Another contradiction in the “secular” Turkish State is the insti-
tution known as the DIB, which is linked to one of the Ministers of 
State.94 This governmental institution is charged with the regulation 
of the religious life of all Muslims living within the country.95 The DI 
appoints religious officials, including imams, pays the stipends of re-
ligious officials, and directs the administration of more than 70,000 
mosques. The DIB takes considerable funds from the state budget, 
but it offers no services to non-Muslim organizations, such as the 
Jewish or Christian communities who do not worship in mosques.  
 
 89. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 90. TURK. CONST., supra note 6, art. 24; see SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 23. See gen-
erally GEYIKDA I, supra note 4, at 141. 
 91. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26 (noting that the Lausanne Treaty 
recognized only Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish religions as minorities). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Shindeldecker, supra note 18 (“Alevis are not officially recognized as a religious 
minority.”). 
 94. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
 95. See generally SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 28–33. 
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Alevi Muslims likewise do not receive state funding, because they 
worship in Cem Houses.96 
B. The Status of the Various Confessions  
(Brotherhoods, Denominations, and Sects) 
Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats)97 have always occupied an impor-
tant place in the social, economic, and political life of the Turkey, 
from the old Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic of today.98 
Throughout the history of Turkey, the convents, monasteries (tekke), 
and lodges (zaviye) of the brotherhoods and sects were centers of 
culture and education. But by the close of the eighteenth century, 
social corruption had destroyed their progressive role of the brother-
hoods, and they became hotbeds of conspiracy.99 
After the Kemalist Revolution and the founding of the Republic 
in 1923, the state sequestered the funds of the brotherhoods and 
suppressed their institutions.100 The state felt justified in its actions 
because most of the brotherhoods supported the Ottoman dynasty 
during the War of Independence and remained potential centers of 
unrest. However, even though suppressed, the brotherhoods contin-
ued to exist and to influence social and political life.101 Today, 
though still technically illegal organizations,102 the brotherhoods’ 
numerous activities persist in Turkey and in Europe, especially in 
Germany, where more than three million Turks live. 
The most important Muslim brotherhoods today include the  
 
 96. See Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
 97. Narrowly defined as a Sufi path of enlightenment. In broader terms, a tarikat has 
been defined as follows: 
[A tarikat is] a number of believers united by the respect that they show for a par-
ticular person or lineage, who they regard as different from other human beings by 
virtue of their [sic] being favoured by God. . . . [F]ollowers of a particular tarikat 
may hold strongly that the teachings of their founding figure are the appropriate 
path to achieve union with God. 
SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 64. I use the term “brotherhood” throughout this article, 
though today, in fact, women do play a large role in some Turkish brotherhoods. 
 98. See J. SPENCER TRIMINGHAM, THE SUFI ORDERS IN ISLAM (1998), for an excellent 
review of the brotherhoods in Islam. See generally SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 64–86. 
 99. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 65. 
 100. See Zeidan, supra note 19. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 8, 65. 
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Naksibendilik, Kadirlik, Rifailik, Nurculuk, Süleymancilik, Isikcilik, 
Mevlevilik, Bektashsilik, and Alevilik. 
1. Nakshibendilik 
This is one of the most widespread and important Sunni broth-
erhoods in Turkey.103 The mother of former President Turgut Ozal 
was head of a Naksi family; she, President Ozal, and his two brothers 
were always active within the Nakshibendilik. This brotherhood has 
continually exercised a certain power in the administration of Tur-
key’s government, as well as in commercial and industrial life gener-
ally.104 
Mohammed Bahaeddine Al Bukhari (1317–1389) founded the 
Nakshibendilik brotherhood,105 a severely disciplinarian fraternity. 
The fundamental purpose of coming together for this group is the 
inner purification of the soul, which must be realized under the di-
rection of a shaykh or chief abbot, called the Perfect Guide (mur-
chid-i kamil). The most important Nakshi shaykh was Dr. Mahmud 
Esad Cosan, former Professor of Theology at Ankara University. But 
he ran into problems with the state and moved to Austria, where he 
recently died. The exercises to which both candidates and members 
must submit are very hard and painful and are meant to induce the 
humility and blindly passive obedience necessary to purify the soul. 
The brothers must also practice repentance and solitude, austerity 
and pity.106 But this brotherhood also emphasizes the importance of 
leading a normal life that is useful to others and that demonstrates 
the individual’s interest in the practical problems of living.107 There is 
a distinct parallel to be observed in the philosophy of Nakshis and 
that of Christian Puritans. This brotherhood attaches enormous im-
 
 103. See Concerning the Naqshbandiyya in Turkey, at  http://www.stormcity.com/ 
salam/cosan/naqshis.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Concerning the Naqshbandi-
yya]. See generally Serif Mardin, The Naksibendi Order in Turkish History, in ISLAM IN 
MODERN TURKEY: RELIGION, POLITICS AND LITERATURE IN A SECULAR STATE 121–42 
(Richard Tapper ed., 1991). 
 104. See generally SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 67–68. 
 105. See Mahmud, Es’ad Cosan, Regarding the Naqshibandi, at  
http://www.stormcity.com/salam/cosan/cosnaqsh.html  (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). 
 106. See Mahmud, Es’ad Cosan, A Few Words About Sufism, at  
http://www.stormcity.com/salam/cosan/cossufis.html  (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). 
 107. See Mahmud, Es’ad Cosan, Comprehending the Message of Islam, at  
http://www.stormcity.com/salam/cosan/cosislam.html  (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); Concern-
ing the Naqshbandiyya, supra note 103. 
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portance to the observance of the traditional Sunni Muslim law of 
the shariat and is very mindful of tradition, opposing all forms of 
dialogue with other religious movements, both Islamic and other-
wise, and opposing modernism is all its forms. 
Since the 1950s, the neighborhood of Fatih in Istanbul, around 
the Iskenderpasha mosque, has become a focal point for Nakshis. 
The disciples of this brotherhood are active in political life. For ex-
ample, the former leader of the Welfare (Refah) Party, Necmettin 
Erbakan, is a Nakshi. The Nakshis own many publications and radio 
stations. 
2. Kadirlik 
This Sunni brotherhood was founded by Abdoul Kadir Geylani 
(1078–1166).108 Its existence as a brotherhood dates from the seven-
teenth century, and by the start of the twentieth century the move-
ment was very powerful in Turkey. 
For Kadiris the Koran is the ultimate truth, but in order to un-
derstand it at its deepest level, it is first necessary to enter a state of 
ecstasy. This is because the corporal body is nothing but an enve-
lope, a cage for the soul created much earlier than the body that 
must be surrendered. One must turn one’s back on the tangible 
world of the senses and regard the interior world with the eyes of the 
heart alone. To reach this state, the practitioner must acquire learn-
ing and insight through many years of listening to and executing the 
precepts of the shaykh. During Zikr ceremonies (repetitive invoca-
tions toward ecstasy) the Kadiris come together in a room and form 
a circle with their hands on their neighbor’s shoulders. They begin 
to sing, accompanied by musical instruments, and when they come 
to the name of God in the song, they shout together, “Hou, 
Hou . . .” and close their eyes as they turn their heads from left to 
right. 
Previously, the Kadiris were convinced that they were the only 
real Muslims. They were opposed to any innovations in society, and 
it was impossible to hold a religious dialogue with them. But today 
they have become very open. 
This brotherhood is widespread in the regions of Marmara and 
the Black Sea. A section of the Kadiris owns a newspaper named 
 
 108. See DENNY, supra note 13, at 247. 
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Yeni Mesaj, the television channel Mesaj and several radio stations. 
3. Rifailik 
Founded by Ahmet Rifai (1118–1181),109 this brotherhood 
originally required total retirement from everyday life and concentra-
tion in solitude in order to achieve liberation from all sensible im-
pressions. Rifailiks believe that God did not grant to mankind a ca-
pacity for complete understanding, so their meditation must consist 
of thinking entirely of God and remembering nothing but His divine 
attributes.110 When a state of ecstasy is reached, the practitioner ar-
rives at a point where he is oblivious to physical pain, even being able 
to walk upon the sharp points of needles. 
In modern times, this brotherhood was reformed and provided 
with a more modern philosophy by the intellectual Kenan Rifai 
Efendi, a graduate of the Lycee of Galatasaray. Today, women oc-
cupy a relatively privileged place in this brotherhood, and, thanks to 
Kenan Rifai, the group is still very popular. It has attracted many in-
tellectuals, such as Mrs. Samiha Ayverdi and Mr. Agah Oktay Guner, 
a former minister of culture, and vice president of one of Turkey’s 
foremost political parties—the Motherland Party. 
This brotherhood is now open to dialogue with other religions. 
4. Nurculuk 
Said Nursi (1876–1960), a Kurd born in the village of Nurs, 
near Bitlis in Turkey, founded this religious order.111 In his youth 
Nursi was very active politically, first allying himself with the Young 
Turks before falling out with them over policy.112 Later, Nursi sup-
ported Ataturk, but was again ostracized due to Nursi’s strong criti-
cism of Ataturk.113 Nursi claimed to be a disciple of both Abdoul 
 
 109. See Ahmed er Rifa’i (1118–1181), http://www.qadiri-rifai.org/rifai.html  (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2002). 
 110. See Zikr: The Ceremony of Remembrance, http://www.qadiri-rifai.org/  (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2002). 
 111. See SERIF MARDIN, RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN TURKEY: THE 
CASE OF BEDIÜZZAMAN SAID NURSI 23, 42 (1989). Two other excellent histories are SÜKRAN 
VAHIDE, BEDIUZZAMAN SAID NURSI (1992), available at  http://bediuzzaman.org/ 
biography/ana/html and MARY WELD, BEDIUZZAMAN SAID NURSI (1992). 
 112. See MARDIN, supra note 111, at 78–88; HOWARD, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
 113. See id. at 94–95. 
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Kadir Geylani114 and of the Imam Rabbani.115 
Nurcus do not constitute a distinct brotherhood of themselves; 
rather, they form an intellectual current of religious thought within 
other structures.116 They study the works of Said Nursi and are quite 
influential among young people who read the Nurcus’s many publi-
cations.117 Although some Nurcu streams are highly fanatical, others 
are open to dialogue with Christianity. It is known that Said Nursi 
himself wrote to the pope calling for collaboration with Christianity 
in the fight against all the forces of materialism, notably Marxism. 
Said Nursi and his followers were supporters of Adnan Menderes, 
who was prime minister of Turkey from 1950 to 1960. Later, the 
Nurcus backed Suleyman Demirel,118 first as prime minister and then 
as president of the Republic. Nurcus are widespread in the Aegean 
region, in Sparta, and in Western Anatolia generally. 
A follower of Said Nursi, Mr. Fethullah Gulen, has become a 
very important personality in Turkish life in recent years.119 He owns 
the TV Channel Zamanyolu, the newspaper Zaman, which has a cir-
culation of approximately 300,000 copies, as well as many other 
weekly and monthly publications. Gulen is known for being an open-
minded and progressive person. For example, he sees the issues sur-
rounding the Islamic scarf as nothing but negligible trifles that 
should not impede the integration of the secular and religious in 
modern times. Gulen met and spoke with Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
Bartholomeos, and also visited the Holy See for an audience with the 
pope.120 Gulen also established the Writers and Journalists Founda-
tion. It encourages interreligious dialogue, has a special section to 
deal with other religions, and has been instrumental in the organiza-
tion of many international interreligious symposia.121 He has also en-
dowed more than 200 schools and two universities worldwide, many 
of them in Central Asia. Recently, several secular groups—certain 
 
 114. See id. at 66, 72. 
 115. See VAHIDE, supra note 111, ch. 9. 
 116. See MARDIN, supra note 111, at 158–60 (describing Nurcu involvement in both 
religious and political networks); SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 68. 
 117. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 70. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 69, 81, 84. 
 120. See Bulent Aras & Omer Caha, Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal “Turkish Islam” 
Movement, 4 MIDDLE EAST REV. INT’L AFF. (2000), available at  http://meria.idc.ac.il/jour-
nal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a4.html. 
 121. See id. 
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newspapers, TV stations, and the army—criticized Gulen, but the 
negative campaign was unsuccessful.122 Despite the failure of the 
campaign, Gulen currently faces subversion charges in Turkey and 
has gone into self-imposed exile in the United States.123 
5. Suleymancilik 
This denomination became popular in 1965, and in many ways 
the Suleymancilik is not so much a distinct brotherhood as it is a 
branch of the Nakshibendilik.124 Its precursor was the twentieth-
century thinker Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, a theologian, lawyer, and 
founder of many important mosques in Istanbul.125 During the 
course of establishing mosques, Tunahan taught courses on the Ko-
ran, and later began to institutionalize his thought on a much larger 
and more structured scale. Former students of these Koranic courses 
later formed themselves into a kind of clandestine society character-
ized by very tight solidarity. Their main credo is that secularism 
equates to atheism. The Suleymancilik are not open to religious dis-
cussion. 
The Suleymancilik brotherhood is quite powerful in Turkish po-
litical and social life, controlling more than 1000 student residence 
halls accommodating almost 100,000 people. The treatment of these 
students by the Suleymancilik is distinguished by very strict discipli-
nary regimes, even though more than ninety percent of the students 
attend non-religious educational establishments. The Suleymancilik 
is also well established in Europe, particularly in Germany. 
6. Ishikchilik 
The name of this brotherhood comes from its twentieth century 
founder, Ishik, the very conservative ex-professor at the Military Ku-
leli College in Istanbul. His son-in-law, Dr. Enver Oren, is an impor-
tant industrialist and owner of the TV station TGRT and the daily 
right-wing newspaper Turkey (Türkiye), which has a circulation of 
 
 122. Even the current Prime Minister and other political opponents on the left wing re-
fuse to speak negatively of him. 
 123. See Gulen: It Has Never Been My Intention to Change or Replace Secular Nature of 
State, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2001, available at  http:// 
www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/12_28_01/feature.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). 
 124. See Concerning the Naqshbandiyya, supra note 103. 
 125. See id. 
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around 300,000. In Turkey, differing political viewpoints, including 
right wing and centralist, appear together. 
Dr. Oren claims to be multidimensional in his thought, and so is 
open to some forms of dialogue. 
7. Mevlevilik 
The Mevlevilik brotherhood is the oldest and most influential 
brotherhood among Muslim intellectuals. Its founder, Mevlana 
Djaleddine Rumi (1207–1273), was a poet and intellectual who in-
vited all religions and tendencies, even sinners, to visit his foyer.126 
His open philosophy was exemplified when he likened the different 
religions to separate houses, observing that if the walls were re-
moved, the same heavenly light would fill them all.127 This brother-
hood enjoyed the protection of the Seljuks, Karamanlis, Ottomans, 
and even Republican leaders after 1950. The Mevlani abbots and 
their descendants are called by the honorific title Celebi, meaning 
“worthy man of God.”128 The elegance and refinement of Mevlani 
ceremonies and rituals, which include a circling dance based on 
Rumi’s concept of the universe as a series of harmonious celestial 
spheres, has almost become part of traditional folklore, and distin-
guishes its disciples from those of other brotherhoods.129 
The Mevlani brotherhood exhibits an amazing openness, num-
bering among its adherents Christian, Jews, and Hindus. This broth-
erhood is extremely anxious to enter into cultural exchanges and in-
terreligious dialogue. 
8. Bektashilik 
This brotherhood is attributed to Haci Bektash,130 and included 
 
 126. See Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, at  http://www.mevlana.net  (last visited Mar. 22, 
2002). See generally DENNY, supra note 13, at 253–57 (providing a short introduction to 
Rumi, his poetry, and his legacy); ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL, MYSTICAL DIMENSIONS OF ISLAM 
309–28 (1975) (detailing the life, theology, and poetry of Rumi). 
 127. See MAULANA JALAL AL-DIN RUMI, DISCOURSES OF RUMI (A.J. Arberry trans., 
1961), for an English translation of Rumi’s teachings. 
 128. See What is a Celebi?, at  http://www.mevlana.net/celebi.htm  (last visited Mar. 22, 
2002). 
 129. Indeed, the “Whirling Dervishes,” as they are called, are one of the largest tourist 
attractions in Turkey today. See Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, supra note 126; DENNY, supra 
note 13, at 255; SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 66. 
 130. “Haci Bektas Veli (1248–1337?)—is pictured as a Turkish thinker, hero, saint, wise 
man, and miracle worker of ‘Alid descent who formed a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic civili-
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among its adherents the Corps of Janissaries.131 Today, the Bektashi 
brotherhood is very widespread among Turkish and Albanian 
Alevis.132 Bektashism is a very tolerant movement, sometimes even 
cited as a model of religious tolerance. Nevertheless, this brother-
hood’s operations are closed to the outside world. Therefore, it is 
not possible to estimate the number of adherents, nor their influence 
on political or social life. It is understood that Bektashis support so-
cialist democratic parties, and a significant group of Bektashis are 
Freemasons.133 Finally, this order has retained its characteristic loyalty 
to Hallajian thought. 
9. Alevilik 
The theology of Anatolian Alevis is based on a multidimensional 
harmonization of faiths. Loyal tendency to old religious traditions is 
well represented in the Alevi CEM Foundation, headed by Mr. 
Izzetin Dogan, a professor at the University of Galatasaray. The Fed-
eration of European Associations of Alevis, which is tied to the daily 
newspaper Cumhuriyet, endeavors to harmonize the principles of so-
cial democracy with the progressive aspects of their sect, even going 
so far as embracing certain features of Marxist ideology.134 In Alevi 
institutions like Haci Bektash Associations (Haci Bektas Dernekieri), 
and Pir Sultan Associations (Pir Sultan Abdal Demekieri), and con-
vents like Shakoulu-Istanbul and Merdivenköy, a certain heterogene-
ity exists between all Alevis. 
C. The Situation Today 
From the establishment of the Turkish Republic until today, cer-
tain Muslim fundamentalists have been elements of destabilization in 
 
sations, reforming Islam in a way suitable to his time and culture.” Zeidan, supra note 19. See 
generally Shindeldecker, supra note 18 (providing a brief history of Haci Bektash). 
 131. See GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 148; Zeidan, supra note 19. 
 132. See Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
 133. See Zeidan, supra note 19 (noting Bektashi association with Freemasons). 
 134. With regard to the Federation’s leftist tendencies, one author stated:  
The resurgence of Sunni fundamentalism that began in the 1950s and has recently 
grown much stronger also pushed the Alevis to the political left. Many Alevis re-
acted by stressing their separate identity and reinterpreting Alevism in socialist and 
Marxist idiom that seemed to have an affinity to Alevi ideals of equality and tradi-
tions of revolt.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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the social and political life of the country. Fundamentalists, and even 
terrorists, have occasionally penetrated Islamist political parties, while 
some Islamist political leaders have openly adopted fundamentalist 
doctrines. But we should not be trapped into thinking that all Mus-
lims, or even all Islamists, are fundamentalists. 
The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), the National 
Salvation Party (Mili Selamet Partisi), the Welfare Party (Refah Par-
tisi), and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) have successively repre-
sented Islamic ideology on the national stage.135 All these parties 
have consecutively appropriated the same ideology and operated 
with the same permanent staff and resources. Indeed, except for the 
most recent Virtue Party, Professor Necmettin Erbakan has led them 
all.136 
In January 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court closed the 
Islamist Welfare Party137 for violating the secular nature of the Re-
public under Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and sections 
101(b) and 103(1) of Law no. 2820 on the Regulation of Political 
Parties.138 Six of the Party’s leaders, including Erbakan, were banned 
from all political activity for five years.139 Almost overnight, the Vir-
tue Party replaced the Welfare Party.140 But the attorney general sub-
sequently filed an indictment seeking closure of the Virtue Party on 
 
 135. See Jon Gorvett, Turkey’s Professional Party Poopers, MIDDLE EAST, Jul. 1, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 11313074. 
 136. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 87–131, for an excellent summary of Erbakan’s 
political career and the aftermath of his fall. 
 137. See id. at 95–107 (reviewing the Welfare Party platform). 
 138. See Refah Partisi [The Welfare Party] v. Turkey, __ Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. __) at 6 
(2001), available at  http://www.echr.coe.int/  [hereinafter Welfare Party Case]; see also Er-
bakan: A Serious Judicial Error, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Jan. 17, 1998, at 1, at  
http://www.turkishdaily news.com/old_editions/01_17_98/dom.htm#d2  (last visited Mar. 
23, 2002); SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 93. The five individuals banned from politics ap-
pealed the case to the European Court of Human Rights, but were disappointed when that 
court upheld the ruling of the Turkish Constitutional Court. See Welfare Party Case, supra, at 
25–32; see also Black Day for Erbakan: ECHR Rules Turkey Justified in Banning Welfare Party, 
TURKISH  DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22005102; Religion and Politics, 
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22005098. See generally Hugg, 
supra note 3; Edip Yuksel, Cannibal Democracies, Theocratic Secularism: The Turkish Version, 7 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423 (1999). 
 139. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 138, at 6, 12; Erbakan: A Serious Judicial Error, 
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Jan. 17, 1998, at 1, available at  http://www.turkishdailynews.com/ 
old_editions/01_17_98/dom.htm#d2. 
 140. See Has Refah Become Fazilet or is it a Fresh Start?, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 16, 
1998, available at 1998 WL 9591357, available at  http://www.turkishdailynews.com/ 
old_editions/05_16_98/comment.htm. 
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the grounds that it promoted antisecular activity and represented the 
ideologies of a formerly banned party.141 The state prevailed, and the 
Virtue Party was also banned, making its 110 seats in Parliament 
technically held by independents.142 
In 1997, among other measures introduced to contain funda-
mentalism, the Government mandated eight years of secular educa-
tion for all children.143 This prohibited attendance at Islamic Imam-
Hatip schools, which were quite popular among Turkish Islamists 
and conservatives as an alternative to secular public education.144 At-
tendance at these schools throughout Anatolia was very high, par-
ticularly among the nouveau riche who favor their more selective 
educational curricula. Under this new law, however, students may 
pursue their studies in these religious schools only after completing 
eight years of compulsory secular education. There is no restriction 
on private religious instruction outside of school hours. 
Another measure taken against public expression of Islamist ideas 
was the restriction on the wearing of the Muslim headscarf by fe-
males at both schools and universities.145 Around fifty professors, as-
sistants, and university administrators were dismissed for either wear-
ing or supporting the right of others to wear the headscarf.146 In 
 
 141. See Gorvett, supra note 135. 
 142. See id. Personally, I felt that the Virtue Party reached a sufficient degree of subtlety 
and sophistication in its structure, and a consciousness of its true place in society, such that its 
successors will be able to adopt strategies and ideologies similar to the history of Christian 
Democrats in Europe and elsewhere. For a chronology of the government activity against the 
Welfare and Virtue parties, see Chronology of Closure Cases Against RP and FP, TURKISH 
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28228576. 
 143. See TURK. CONST., supra note 6, art. 24; 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 
26. 
 144. See 2001 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 26. 
 145. See MAZLUMDER slams IU President Over Beards, Headscarves Row, TURKISH 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9590245 [hereinafter Headscarves Row]. 
See generally ELIZABETH ÖZDALGA, THE VEILING ISSUE, OFFICIAL SECULARISM AND 
POPULAR ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (1998) (discussing several pre-1998 high profile veil 
cases). 
 146. This measure was found to be in line with both human rights schemes and the 
Turkish Constitution by The Human Rights Coordination Supreme Council of Turkey. See 
Head Scarf Ban Not Against Human Rights, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 9, 1998, available 
at 1998 WL 9591765. Chairman of the Council, State Minister Hikmet Sami Turk, said the 
following 
[T]he ban on wearing head scarves in government offices and universities is not 
against the basic human rights and freedoms because the head scarves are symbols of 
“political ideology,” . . . .  
The regulations pertaining to headscarves, if evaluated according to the 
Constitution, are part of the Constitutional principle of secularism which 
OKT-FIN2.DOC 6/6/02  10:25 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
398 
1999, Mrs. Merve Kavakchi, a newly elected Member of Parliament 
and member of the Virtue Party, tried to take her seat while wearing 
her headscarf.147 Subsequently, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, Presi-
dent Suleyman Demirel, and the National Security Council loudly 
condemned Kavakchi. Her action was seen as an outright challenge 
to the principles of the secular state and its ban on headscarves on 
publicly owned premises. In response, and through the manipulation 
of an administrative decision, the government deprived Kavakchi of 
her Turkish citizenship simply because she already held U.S. citizen-
ship without the consent of the Turkish government.148 She was also 
deprived of her parliamentary privileges, although technically not of 
her elected seat, since Parliament did not vote to remove them from 
her. To regain her Turkish citizenship, Kavakchi married a Turkish 
man,149 but the Turkish Constitutional Court still will not accept 
Kavakchi as a member of Parliament. 
Until February 28, 1997, the President of the Welfare Party, Er-
bakan, was prime minister of a coalition government formed by an 
alliance with Mrs. Tansu Chiller’s Right Way Party (Dogruyol Par-
tisi), a liberal right-wing party.150 When Erbakan first took power, he 
raised many eyebrows when he invited several Islamists, including 
known extremists, to visit at his official residence. On one occasion, 
Erbakan entertained the heads of all the brotherhoods as his guests 
for a Ramadan dinner.151 This caused a great scandal among the gen-
eral Turkish public, among secularists, and particularly among the 
already suspicious army. Other inciteful actions taken by Erbakan in-
clude a statement he made during a public speech in which he said 
that Islamic revolution was the destiny of Turkey. He then indicated 
that he did not know whether such a revolution would be bloody or 
 
tution, are part of the Constitutional principle of secularism which warrants the 
objectivity of the state in religious issues. In this context, a ban on headscarves, 
which are used as a symbol of political ideology, does not go against the Con-
stitution[.]  
Id.  
 147. See Ilnur Cevik, It’s Time We Solve the Merve Puzzle, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 
23, 1999, available at 1999 WL 22751104; Headscarf Controversy Dominates Agenda as the 
New Parliament Convenes, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 
5567303. 
 148. See Cevik, supra note 147. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 138, at 3; SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 92. 
 151. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 138, at 3; SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 107. 
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not.152 This and other such utterances made Erbakan highly unpopu-
lar with the army, which from the start viewed Erbakan’s coalition 
government with great disfavor. Finally, after many frictions, the 
army decided to act by convening a meeting of the National Security 
Council. 
The National Security Council was created by the Constitution 
and is comprised of the president, the prime minister, the ministers 
of defense and the interior, certain other government officials, the 
commander-in-chief of the armed services, and the heads of the 
army, navy, and air force.153 The recommendations of the National 
Security Council are theoretically only advisory, but in fact have 
served as the foundation for military coups staged in the past.154 
The Council recommended stern measures to contain fundamen-
talism and to guard the secular nature of the state.155 Erbakan could 
not accept the measures and resigned.156 A caretaker government was 
formed to prepare for new elections, and, as mentioned above, the 
Welfare Party lost its status as the biggest single element in Parlia-
ment eight months later. 
Throughout the occurrence of these events, manipulation of 
democratic rights and freedom of religion by Islamists was rightly 
condemned by the state. There were many abuses. For example, the 
Turkish Hezbollah was, and still is, a very serious problem.157 This 
terrorist Islamist organization has tortured and killed more than 300 
people over the years. Fortunately, the state finally organized a very 
wide and thorough campaign to eliminate Turkish Hezbollah. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the state should limit its power 
within the confines of normal democratic rules and norms, especially 
now that Turkey has been accepted as a candidate for accession to 
the European Union. It is essential that the state carefully differenti-
 
 152. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 138, at 3, 8, 29; Ban on Erbakan Final, TURKISH 
DAILY NEWS, Jul. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22786960. 
 153. See TURK. CONST., supra note 6, art. 118 (amended 2001); see also SHANKLAND, 
supra note 3, at 111. 
 154. See, e.g., Headscarves Row, supra note 145. 
 155. See SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 204–08, for the full text of the Security Council 
Recommendations. 
 156. See In Turkey, the First Coup (Part II), TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Apr. 15, 1998, 
available at 1998 WL 9590612; see also SHANKLAND, supra note 3, at 93, 111. 
 157. See, e.g., Turkish Hezbollah: “No state links,” BBC NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2000, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/europe/newsid_615000/615785.stm (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2002). 
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ate between legitimate Islamic practices and terrorism in its crack-
downs. 
D. Various Problems 
1. The financial aspect 
a. Muslims. As mentioned before, the religious life of Muslim be-
lievers is officially organized and regulated by the DIB. This institu-
tion receives a substantial amount of funding from the annual na-
tional budget of the state, accounting for some five percent of the 
total budget. 
The so-called illegal brotherhoods receive no state support and 
must obtain all their funding from within their respective communi-
ties. 
b. Non-Muslims. Non-Muslims receive no financial aid from the 
state. The members of their communities must meet all expenses for 
their religious activities, including the salaries of priests and preach-
ers. 
2. The internal structures of religious bodies 
a. Muslims. The DIB makes all decisions regarding the appoint-
ment of religious officials, including imams and muftis. Muftis are 
charged with the administration of religion within certain defined 
districts, such as a city, large town, or other administrative unit. 
The leaders of the so-called illegal brotherhoods, generally re-
ferred to as shaykhs, are selected and confirmed by the general con-
sent of the members of their respective brotherhoods. However, re-
cently a new precedent was established when, before his death, Dr. 
Esad Cosan nominated his own son as successor shaykh of the Nak-
shibendis. 
Within the Alevi tradition, shaykhs are referred to as “grandfa-
thers” and are chosen from the genealogical bloodline of the Caliph 
Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed.158 
b. Non-Muslims. Non-Muslims are allowed to observe the ca-
nonical law of their own particular denominations to determine in-
ternal structure and leadership. 
 
 158. See Shindeldecker, supra note 18. 
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3. Religion and culture 
a. Muslims. The roles of the “illegal” sects and denominations 
are an important factor in the life of Turkish Muslims. I have already 
dealt with their activities supra in Part IV.B. 
b. Non-Muslims. As previously mentioned, the activities of the 
Greek Orthodox Church of the Phanar have achieved worldwide im-
portance since the election of the Patriarch Bartholomeos in 1991. 
The new Armenian Orthodox Patriarch, Mesrop II, who was elected 
in 1998, also took a new and important position in the cultural and 
social life of Turkey, while the Syriac Church’s cultural contribution 
is rather less important. 
The Roman Catholic Church occupies a very important place in 
the interreligious dialogue of Turkey. The vicar of the Vatican, Mgr. 
Marowitch, organizes meetings and seminars among the different re-
ligious leaders. For example, he was instrumental in arranging the 
visit of Mr. Fethullah Gulen to the Holy See.159 
In 1992, the Jewish Quincentennial Foundation organized 
worldwide cultural activities to mark the five hundredth year since 
Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain were welcomed to a new home-
land in Turkey.160 Tolerance and humanitarianism mark the relation-
ship between Muslims and Jews, both in the old Ottoman Empire 
and in Modern Turkey.161 In fact, the Jewish sector constitutes a very 
important pressure group in Turkish political and cultural life. 
4. Religious participation in public institutions (prisons, hospitals, 
armed forces, etc.) 
a. Muslims. In prisons and hospitals, the DIB officially nominates 
imams. However, in practice these imams do not fill a very important 
role, as their function is largely confined to conducting funeral cere-
monies. In the armed services, which are secular in nature, imams 
have no regular religious responsibilities, either. Only during times 
of war are military imams allowed to offer religious assistance to their 
comrades, and even then it must be unstructured assistance. 
b. Non-Muslims. There are no Christian or Jewish chaplains 
catering to the needs of their constituents in Turkish prisons or  
 159. See Marowitch: Gulen Discussed Religious Issues with Pope, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, 
May 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22002895. 
 160. See Quincentennial Foundation Website, http://www.sephardichouse.org/ 
quincentennial-foundation.html  (last visited Mar 30, 2002). 
 161. See generally id. 
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tering to the needs of their constituents in Turkish prisons or hospi-
tals. However, in non-Muslim religious hospitals and other institu-
tions, priests and rabbis are free to offer spiritual assistance to the 
members of their respective flocks. 
5. Marriage 
For all citizens of Turkey, civil marriage is prescribed by law and 
is the only form of marriage that carries any legal status. Neverthe-
less, after civil marriage, couples are free to participate in a religious 
marriage ceremony according to their particular rites, though Mus-
lims are not allowed to do so in a mosque. 
There is no legal bar against marriages of mixed religion in Tur-
key. Children of such marriages have the right to choose their own 
religion at the age of eighteen. Before that age, children are subject 
to the consensual agreement of their parents in the matter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Turkey constitutes an important bridge between the East and the 
West, not only by virtue of its geographic position, but also because 
of its historical and cultural background. As a cultural and racial en-
tity, Turkish Anatolia is an amalgam of different ethnic groups and 
civilizations. Having come from Central Asia, Persia, Arabia, the 
Mediterranean, and the Balkans, the people today called Turks have 
experienced and absorbed elements from many different cultures. 
For this reason, Turkish interpretation of Islam is multidimensional 
and multicolored in many of its aspects. It is not rigidly sectarian like 
that of many of the regimes in this geographical area. 
Of course, Turkey is an old society, and so inevitably has brought 
with it some culture and custom incompatible with modern concep-
tions of human rights. The concept of natural law became part of 
Western philosophy during the Age of Enlightenment, but only en-
tered the Turkish legal system much later. New ideologies cannot 
easily be accepted or assimilated by a collective consciousness formed 
by so many different conceptions of law and jurisprudence. Even the 
Western world has had its problems in the field of human rights in 
the twentieth century. Indeed, in the United States there are several 
Christian fundamentalist denominations that are extremely fanatical 
who want the “secular” U.S. Constitution amended to reflect their 
views. Further, the Roman Catholic Church has made considerable 
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progress in the field of democracy beginning with the influence of 
St. Thomas Aquinas. But we must never forget that according to 
Aquinas, a state loses legitimacy if it does not respect the Lex Divina. 
As this can only be interpreted by the clergy, the door to state theoc-
racy in parts of the West is still open. 
Religion is an enduring and important factor in the political and 
social life of all countries, including those that make up the Christian 
world. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to place the problems of re-
ligion in Turkey in their worldwide context, and to see them from an 
objective viewpoint. 
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